Competitive Information Disclosure by Multiple Senders

2021-06-02 Publications

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We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

Author
Pak Hung Au
Associate Professor, Department of Economics
Pak Hung Au is an associate professor at the Department of Economics of the HKUST. He obtained his…
Keiichi Kawai
UNSW, Sydney
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